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Abstract
In this paper, we revisit the problem of self-disconnection among pre-
payment energy customers. Using metering data from 2.3 million elec-
tricity pre-payment customers, we study how often households with an
electricity pre-payment meter tend to self-disconnect over the course of a
year and why they do so.
What we nd is that, in any given year, the majority of households
(ca. 78%) do not self-disconnect; ca. 12% self-disconnect once; ca. 3%
self-disconnect more often than four times. We also nd that most self-
disconnections (>62%) last for less than one day; between 72% and 82%
last for less than two days; 12%-18% last for more than 3 days.
As for the main driver of self-disconnection, we identify nancial con-
straints. This suggests that it is likely to be di¢ cult/expensive to reduce
the total number of self-disconnections. In the last part of the paper, we
argue, however, that it may (still) be possible to reduce the negative im-
pact of self-disconnection in a relatively inexpensive way at least to some
extent by helping households to better smooth their self-disconnections
over the course of a year.
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drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Michael Pollitt for commenting on and helping
to improve the paper at various stages of its development. Further, I would like to thank
Richard Duck; Richard Jones; Christopher Mitchell; and Christoniel Putter from Centrica
for their interest in the project and their great support. Last but not least, I am grateful to
Julian Misell and Trevor Taylor from Ipsos Mori for their excellent collaboration on the eld
work. Financial support from the EPSRC (Flexnet) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual
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1 Introduction
Pre-payment energy meters are widely used in Great Britain. To date approx-
imately 3.6 million households (14%) use pre-payment meters to pay for their
electricity; 2.6 million households (10%) use them to pay for their gas consump-
tion; and 2.3 million households (9%) use them to pay for both: electricity and
gas.
Modern pre-payment meters work in a similar way to pre-payment mobile
phones: customers purchase credit at an outlet which they then use to top-up
their meters. The meters come with several advantages: they allow customers
to break their energy bills into a series of (arbitrarily) small payments; they
often come with a lower-than-standard tari¤; and detailed information feedback
allows pre-payment customers to better monitor their energy use.
The main disadvantage of pre-payment meters is that they can lead to self-
disconnection: if credit runs out, energy supply is stopped.1 Little is known
about self-disconnection: while the regulator (OFGEM) records and monitors
the number of disconnections among non-pre-payment customers, no compa-
rable e¤ort is made to capture the extent (and drivers) of self-disconnection
among pre-payment customers.
Several studies have tried to estimate the extent and drivers of self-disconnec-
tion. The conclusions from these studies, however, vary signicantly: while some
nd that self-disconnection is a widespread phenomenon, others argue that it
is an issue for at most a small fraction of pre-payment customers. Similarly,
while some studies argue that nancial constraints are at the core of most
self-disconnections, others claim that nancial constraintsare responsible for
a relatively small share of self-disconnections only.
In this paper, we take a fresh look at the issue of self-disconnection. We ask:
 What is the extent of self-disconnection?
 What are the main drivers of self-disconnection? And
 What policy measures are there to address the issue of self-disconnection?
We add to the existing literature in several ways: we use (new) metering
data from 2.3 million pre-payment customers to study how often households self-
disconnect; we provide a series of formal hypothesis tests for why households
1We will provide a more precise denition of what we mean by self-disconnection in section
3.3.
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self-disconnect (instead of relying on descriptive evidence only); and suggest
several novel policy instruments which can help reduce the negative impact of
self-disconnections.
The main ndings of our research are that every year only about a fth of
pre-payment customers self-disconnect; many of these customers self-disconnect
for a relatively short period of time only; for some of them, however, the (total)
duration without electricity (due to self-disconnection) is considerable. As for
the main driver of self-disconnection, we identify nancial constraints.
From a policy perspective the main conclusion arising from our research is
that although reducing the total number of self-disconnections is likely to be
di¢ cult/expensive, it may (still) be possible to reduce the negative impact of
self-disconnection in a relatively inexpensive way by helping households to better
smooth the number of self-disconnections over the course of a year (instead of
letting them self-disconnect when it hurts the most).
The paper is organised as follows: In the rst part, we give some back-
ground information on the pre-payment situation in Great Britain. The sec-
ond part provides new estimates of the extent of self-disconnection in Great
Britain. In the third part, we argue that reducing the total number of self-
disconnections is likely to be di¢ cult/expensive. The fourth, fth and sixth
part o¤er an alternative angle on the problem (by looking at householdstiming
of self-disconnections). The seventh part concludes.
2 Background
In this section, we provide some background information on the pre-payment
situation in Great Britain.
2.1 Pre-Payment Metering in Great Britain
Pre-payment meters have experienced a signicant increase in popularity in
Great Britain in the past 20 years. Figure 1a illustrates the change in the use
of pre-payment meters since 1990.
The gure shows an increase in the share of households using a pre-payment
meter to pay for their electricity from ca 8% in 1990 to 14% in 2008 ; an increase
in the share of households using a pre-payment meter to pay for their gas from
3% to 10%; and an increase in the share of households using a pre-payment
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meter to pay for both electricity and gas from 2% to 9%.2
Figure 1a: Share of households using Figure 1b: Share of households by
pre-payment metering.3 type of meter.
The recent increase in popularity of pre-payment meters is closely linked to
a change in technology:4 Figure 1b shows the evolution of the share of house-
holds using traditional coin-in-the-slot meters vs modern token/key meters. The
gure shows that while the share of households using slot meters remained rel-
atively constant, the share of households using token/key meters has increased
signicantly (since their introduction approximately 20 years ago).
The main di¤erence between coin-in-the-slot meters and token/key meters
is that with token/key meters money is not entered into the meters directly 
but via pre-programmed cards (token meters); or a customer specic chip card
(key meters), respectively. This has made/makes pre-payment metering safer
with token/key meters and so more acceptable for customers.
The cashless top-up mechanism of token/key meters also meant/means that
no money has to be collected from the meters. This has made/makes pre-
payment metering (with token/key meters) economically more attractive for
energy companies which, in turn, has allowed them to reduce their energy
tari¤s for these meters.
A second di¤erence between coin-in-the-slot meters and token/key meters is
that token/key meters typically come with an emergency credit facility: while
households with a traditional coin-in-the-slot meter are without energy as soon
2Data: 2009 Living Cost and Food Survey (LCF). All statistics are weighted.
3Data: Family Expenditure Survey; Expenditure and Food Survey and Living Cost and
Food Survey.
4For a detailed analysis of the di¤usion process underlying pre-payment metering see Zhang
et al (2009)
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as they run out of credit, households with a token/key meter are typically
provided with (on average) £ 5 of emergency credit.
The idea of emergency creditis to give households time to make another
top-up before switching o¤ their energy supply. Naturally, whatever emergency
credit has been used will be subtracted from the next top-up(s)  but no
interest/penalty will be charged.
2.2 Who uses pre-payment meters?
Despite the increase in popularity of pre-payment meters in the past 20 years,
it is important to note that pre-payment customers (still) represent a fairly
distinct group of households.
Using data from the Living Cost and Food Survey 2009, Table 1 below re-
ports summary statistics for households with no pre-payment meter; households
with an electricity pre-payment meter (but no gas pre-payment meter); and for
households with both: an electricity pre-payment meter and a gas pre-payment
meter.5
5Data: 2009 LCF. All statistics are weighted.
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Variable Non-PPM E-PPM p-value E&G-PPM p-value
(N o n v s E -P PM ) (E -v s E & G -P PM )
N 4,605 281 447
Age 53.16 46.46 <0.01 44.24 0.04
(16.81) (15.54) (15.65)
Gender 0.36 0.45 <0.01 0.55 0.01
(Fem=1) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
Single 0.33 0.49 <0.01 0.49 0.72
(Sing=1) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50)
Income 704.93 443.22 <0.01 378.42 0.02
(weekly) (475.76) (270.86) (236.75)
Active 0.63 0.54 <0.01 0.43 0.01
(Act=1) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
Hh size 2.32 2.32 0.81 2.58 0.01
(1.24) (1.41) (1.43)
# Children 0.33 0.47 <0.01 0.62 0.03
(0.73) (0.88) (0.95)
Type house 0.27 0.05 <0.01 0.01 <0.01
(det=1) (0.45) (0.21) (0.01)
Rent 0.21 0.67 <0.01 0.77 <0.01
(Rent=1) (0.41) (0.47) (0.42)
Countrys. 0.14 0.15 0.83 0.01 <0.01
(Cntrys=1) (0.35) (0.36) (0.11)
Table 1: Summary Statistics by payment type.
The table shows that all three groups of households are (statistically) fairly
di¤erent from each other. To give an example: the table shows that households
with an electricity pre-payment meter are signicantly more likely to have a
female household head; signicantly less likely to be economically active; and
signicantly more likely to rent their home than households without a pre-
payment meter.
Similarly for households with an electricity and gas pre-payment meter:
the table shows that households with an electricity pre-payment and gas pre-
payment meter are (even) more likely to have a female household head; (even)
less likely to be economically active; and (even) more likely to rent their home
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than households with an electricity meter only.
3 The Extent of Self-Disconnection
In this section, we review the literature on self-disconnection and provide new
estimates of the extent of the problem.
3.1 Self-disconnection What we know
Several studies have looked at the extent and drivers of self-disconnection. The
main studies are summarized in Table 2 below.
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Study Appr. Sample Extent of SD Drivers
Drakeford Survey 388 households- 51% (60%) of Primarily prob-
(1995) recruited through electricity (gas) lems to a¤ord
the Citizen Adv. customers report credit.
Bureaux and so- having been w/o
cial services of- supply in past
ces in the South
of Wales.
Centre for Survey 271 households - 28% of electr./ 62% self-
Sustain. which receive gas report having disconnected
Energy council tax bene- self-disconnctd because of a
(1998) ts in the past. lack of money;
30% because
of a closed out-
let.
Doble Face to 200 randomly 33% of cust. Reasons for self-
(2000) Face chosen pre- report having disconnections
inter- payment gas cus- self-disconnctd were primarily
views tomers in Coven- at one point in convenience
try area the last year.
Centre f. Survey 100 households 14% of gas pre- 86% (91%) of
manage.. with electric- payment; electricity (gas)
u. Regul. ity/gas pre-pay 9% of electricity customers report
(2001) ment meter prepayment me- self-disconnctn
ter customers for a reason other
than lack of
money.
Regional Survey6 Between 48 and Between 15% & Reasons vary
Studies 2360 households a large number from having for-
in certain small of pre-payment gotten to top-up
regions. householdsre- meters to coordi-
port self- nation problems
disconnections. to lack of money.
Table 2: Overview of the Self-Disconnection Literature
6Scottish Hydro-Electric (1997); Scottish Hydro-Electric (1998); Merseyside Right to Fuel
Action and Liverpool City Council (1998); Birminham Settlement, Community Energy Re-
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What is interesting about the previous literature is the variation in ndings
across studies. To give an example: while Drakeford (1995) nds that more
than 50% of households self-disconnect at one point over the course of a year,
Doble (2000) argues that this number is closer to 30%. Several regional studies
come to even lower estimates.7 The same is true with respect to the drivers of
self-disconnection.8
It is not clear what is at the core of these di¤erences across studies. It seems
likely, however, that di¤erences in the timing of studies play an important role
(with more households self-disconnecting in the past few years than today).
In addition because all previous studies rely exclusively on survey data  it
seems likely that di¤erences in sample selection; sample size; survey method;
and the context of the survey are responsible for (at least part of) the variation
in ndings across studies.
3.2 Metering Data
One way to deal with some of the methodological issues of the previous literature
is by using metering data.
We have access to metering data from 2.3 million households with an elec-
tricity pre-payment account with British Gas spanning the years 2007 to 2010
(inclusive). The dataset which was provided to us in condence  includes
information on electricity consumption, top-up behaviour and the use of emer-
gency credit.
The main advantage of metering data (vis-a-vis the survey data used in most
earlier studies) is that it allows us to get access to a signicantly larger sample
of households than was possible in most earlier studies. In addition, metering
data allows us to circumvent problems of recall/response bias; and it allows
us to ensure that our ndings are independent of the survey method used/the
context of the survey.9
To get a sense for whether the households in our metering dataset are also
(more) similar to a repesentative sample of pre-payment customers, we randomly
search and Bristol Energy Centre (1993)
7These include: Birmingham Settlement (1993); Liverpool City Council (1998); Money
Matters and Scottish Power (1997); Scottish Hydro Electric (1998).
8While the study by the Centre for Sustainable Energy (1998) nds that lack of moneyis
the main driver of self-disconnection, a comparable study by the Centre for Management under
Regulation (2001) argues that forgetting to purchase credit is of at least equal importance to
understand why households self-disconnect.
9For the importance of survey method/context see e.g. Browning et al (2003)
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drew a sample of households from our dataset; asked them a series of background
questions (in a telephone survey); and compared the ndings from this survey
with the ndings from the 2009 Living Cost and Food Survey.
Table 3 shows the results from this analysis.10
Variable BG Sample LCF Sample p-value
Number of observations 502 728
Age 45.02 45.07 0.95
(13.73) (15.64)
Gender 0.63 0.51 <0.01
(Female=1) (0.48) (0.50)
Marital status 0.37 0.49 <0.01
(Single=1) (0.48) (0.50)
Income 190.60 209.021 0.22
(200.14) (291.7098)
Laour Market Status 0.48 0.47 0.34
(Active=1) (0.50) (0.50)
Household size 2.61 2.47 0.15
(1.48) (1.43)
Number of Children in hh. 0.63 0.56 0.25
(1.20) (0.93)
Type house 0.07 0.04 0.11
(detached=1) (0.26) (0.14)
Rent 0.75 0.73 0.43
(Rent=1) (0.43) (0.44)
Table 3: Summary Statistics British Gas Sample and LCF Sample
The Table shows that except for gender and marital status11 the house-
holds in our sample are (statistically) very similar to the households with an
electricity pre-payment meter in the Living Cost and Food Survey which sug-
gests that despite coming from one company only our dataset is (close to
being) representative for all households with an electricity pre-payment meter.
10All statistics are weighted using survey weights.
11Please note: since we are targeting the household member in charge of purchasing top-up
(rather than the household reference person) it is not surprising that this persons background
characteristics are di¤erent from those of the one interviewed in the LCF (i.e. the household
reference person in the LCF).
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3.3 Dening Self-Disconnection
One short-coming of our metering data is that it does not record directly when
households are without electricity.
What is recorded, however, is whether (and how much) emergency credit a
household has used by the time it tops-up its meter. This allows us to get a sense
for whether and when households self-disconnect dening a self-disconnection
as a situation in which a household has used up all its emergency credit by the
time it tops-up its meter.
Most earlier studies dene self-disconnection as a situation in which energy
supply is stopped due to insu¢ cient funds on the meter. This is less strict than
our denition. The reason is that energy supply can stop (due to insu¢ cient
funds) before a household has used up its emergency credit. To use emergency
credit, it has to be activated (which can be done by pressing a key on the meter).
To the extent, however, that what matters from a policy perspective is when
households are without the possibility of electricity (unless they purchase more
credit), it seems reasonable to dene self-disconnection as a situation in which
supply is stopped and a household has exhausted all the credit available to it
(i.e. including its emergency credit) rather than one where electricity supply
is stopped but emergency credit is possibly still available.
3.4 The Extent of Self-Disconnection Revisited
Figure 2 below shows how often households tend to self-disconnect over the
course of a year using our denition of self-disconnection.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the Frequency to Self-Disconnect.
The gure shows that in 2010 the large majority of households never self-
disconnected (ca 78%); 12% of households self-disconnected once; approximately
3% of households self-disconnected more often than four times. The gure also
shows that the pattern in self-disconnections is relatively stable across years 
with a slightly lower share of households self-disconnecting in 2010 than the
years before.
3.5 The Extent of Self-Disconnection Revisited 2
We can also use our metering data to proxy the duration of self-disconnections.
Figure 3 below shows the distribution of when households top-up their meters
after (being predicted to)12 having self-disconnected.
12We have no direct information for how long households self-disconnect. However, we can
proxy the duration of self-disconnections by taking the di¤erence between how long the last
top-up before a self-disconnection should have lasted and the date of the next top-up. For
this calculation we proceed as follows: rst, we take the ratio between the consumption of
each household that has self-disconnected and the median household (excluding households
from the calcuation for the median which have self-disconnected ) one month before the self-
disconnection. We then assume that our households would have consumed the same fraction
of what the median household consumes in the month in which our households actually self-
disconnect (as in the month before). In the nal step, we take di¤erence between the prediction
of when our households should have run out of credit resulting from the last step and when they
actually top-up their meters - to proxy the duration of each self-disconnection. Please note:
this is likely to be a relatively conservative measure of the duration of self-disconnections, since
it does not take into account that households may be rationing before they self-disconnect.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the Timing to Reconnect
What we nd is that the majority of self-disconnections (>62%) last for less
than one day (with households topping-up their meter on the same day they are
predicted to have run out of credit); between 72% and 82% of self-disconnections
last for less than two days. 12% to 18% of self-disconnections last longer than
3 days.
3.6 The Extent of Self-Disconnection Revisited 3
Finally, we can use our metering data to relate the frequency with which house-
holds self-disconnect and the duration they are without electricity. Figure 4
below shows this relationship. (It is based on a local linear regression which
allows us to smooth the data).
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Figure 4: Linking Frequency and Duration w/o Elec.
What we nd is a positive relationship between the two variables such that
households which self-disconnect once per year tend to be without electricity
for approximately one day per year while households which self-disconnect ve
times per year tend to be without electricity for almost seven days per year. This
suggests that at least for some households self-disconnection constitutes a
signicant burden.
4 Self-Disconnection: A Hard Policy Problem
The previous literature (see Table 2) has identied four possible drivers of self-
disconnection:
1. Financial Constraints;
2. Forgetting to top-up ones meter;
3. Coordination issues among household members when it comes to purchas-
ing credit; and
4. Unavailability of credit (e.g. because of a closed outlet)
In this section, we test the relative importance of the four potential drivers
using our metering data.
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4.1 The drivers of self-disconnection revisited
One way to test why households self-disconnect is by regressing how often house-
holds have self-disconnected in 2010 on measures/proxies for each of the four
potential drivers.
That is, we can regress the number of self-disconnections on a measure of
nancial constraints; a self-stated measure of forgetfulness; a measure of who
is responsible for purchasing credit13 (as a proxy for coordination issues); a
measure of how much opening hours of outlets selling top-up are perceived as
an issue (as a proxy for unavailability of credit); and a set of controls .
Our model then takes the following form:
SDi = o + 1Xi + 2Zi + "i (1)
where SDi is the number of self-disconnections of household i in 2010. Xi is a
vector summarising our main variables (measuring nancial constraints, forget-
fulness etc); Zi a vector of control variables and  the corresponding regression
coe¢ cients. "i is an error term. We estimate (1) by means of OLS (using a
log-lin specication)14 and by means of Generalised Methods of Moments.15
4.2 A Note on the Data
For the analysis, we match our metering data with data from a telephone survey
(same as before).16 The households in our survey were randomly drawn from
the population of all households with an electricity pre-payment account with
British Gas. Within each household, our interview was directed at the household
member in charge of purchasing top-up.
To deal with the large number of households that have not self-disconnected/
have self-disconnected only once in 2010 we stratied our sample along the
number of self-disconnections giving more weight to households which have
13The answer possibilities ranged from: always the same person to never the same person.
14That is, we use the log of the number of self-disconnections in 2010 as our dependent
variable; code all zero counts as onesand regress the log of self-disconnections on our key
variables and a dummy variable that equals one for all zero counts. See: Hausman, Hall and
Griliches (1984).
15Both approaches allow us to instrument for possible problems of measurement error; zero
ination will be addressed in the next the section. In case of our GMM estimation, we specied
both an additive and multiplicative error term (as proposed by Mullahy, 1997). The results,
however, were virtually identical.
16The eldwork was carried out by Ipsos Mori.
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self-disconnected more often. Table 4 provides summary statistics of the strat-
ication we used.17
Strata 1 Strata 2 Strata 3 Strata 4
Number of Self-Disconnections 0 1-2 3-5 6+
Number of observations 126 125 126 125
Share in population 78% 16.5% 3.85% 1.65%
Share in sample 25% 25% 25% 25%
Table 4: Overview Stratication
To capture whether households are nancially constrainedwe asked them
whether they have been in arrears (with regard to mortgage, rent, loan instal-
ments etc) in the last year; whether they have been assisted with debt repayment
by a debt advice agency; and how they regard their payment capacity to cover
bills (very good to very di¢ cult)?
Following the European Commission (2008), we code a household as -
nancially constrained if it reports di¢ culties with respect to either of these
dimensions. To capture forgetfulnessof the household member in charge of
purchasing top-up, we asked him/her in the interview whether he/she considers
him-/herself forgetful.18 Summary statistics of our key variables are provided
in Appendix A.
4.3 Analysis
Table 5 provides the results from our estimation of (1).19
The rst column and third column show our baseline results. The second
column and fourth column show the results from the same analysis if we in-
strument for forgetfulnessto account for possible problems of measurement
error.
17The response rate was: 60%.
18See e.g. Commissaris and Ponds (1998)
19Unweighted results. To guard against the possibility that our inference is unduly a¤ected
by sampling weights, we estimated our model also with sampling weights. What we nd is
that our point-estimates tend to be smaller; the same is true for the standard errors with
sampling weights - but the main conclusions remain the same.
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OLS Estimation GMM Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Constraints 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.35*** 0.55*
(0.06) (0.08) 0.05 (0.35)
Forgetfulness 0.07 -0.11 0.08 -0.13
(0.08) (1.05) 0.06 (1.05)
Reachabililty 0.02 0.03 0.004 -0.14
(0.10) (0.11) 0.08 (0.39)
Coordination Issues 0.07 0.08 0.13** 0.01
(0.07) (0.08) 0.06 (0.34)
Socio-economic Controls Yes20 Yes Yes Yes
Table 5: Results Regression Analysis of (1) - Statistically
Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *
What we nd is that only one variable is statistically signicantly related to
the number of self-disconnections: which is, nancial constraints. Specically,
we nd that being nancially constrainedis associated with an increase in the
average number of self-disconnections by between 19 and 35 percent.
This result is robust (qualitatively and quantitatively) to the estimation
method we use. It is also robust to instrumenting for forgetfulness(using age
of the household member in chargeas an instrument).
4.4 Robustness Check
One possible explanation why we nd a statistically signicant e¤ect for nan-
cial constraintsbut none of the other potential drivers of self-disconnection is
that the other drivers have a signicant e¤ect on the number of self-disconnections
only at certain points in the distribution of self-disconnections.
To give an example, it is possible that households in which the household
member in charge of purchasing top-up is forgetful are either e¤ective in
dealing with this problem or not e¤ective at all (but nothing in between).
In this case, we would expect that forgetful householdsare no more likely
to self-disconnect once than other households, but given that they have self-
disconnected once are signicanlty more likely to self-disconnect again (and
again).21
20Unless otherwise stated, in the following socio-economic controls include: age; gender;
marital status; labour market status and housing. To estimate (1), we also included a control
variable capturing whether a household has a car/van - to control for di¤erences in mobility.
21See e.g. Agarwal et al (2008)
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What this means is that the average e¤ect of forgetfulness may be in-
signicant even though forgetfulness has a signicant e¤ect on the probability
that households self-disconnect at a certain point in the distribution of self-
disconnections. One way to check if this is the case is by using a quantile
regression approach.
Unlike OLS (or GMM)22 , a quantile regression is not limited to explaining
the mean of the number of self-disconnections, but allows us to explain the de-
terminants at any point of the distribution of self-disconnections.23 The results
from a quantile analysis of (1) are presented in Figures 5a-5d below.24
Figure 5a: QR Financial Constraints Figure 5b: QR Forgetfulness
Figure 5c: QR Opening Hours Figure 5d: QR Coordination Issues
The horizontal lines represent the GMM point estimates of each coe¢ cient
from before. The moving lines plot how these estimates vary over di¤erent quan-
tiles of our dependent variable (and the corresponding condence intervals).25
22By that we mean standard GMM. There are quantile GMM approaches which are not
limited to explaining the mean of a dependent variable. See e.g. Abadie (2003); or Lee (2007)..
23See Koenker, Bassett (1978); and Koenker, Hallock (2001)
24We estimate (1) using Machado and Silvas (2005) jittering approach.
25A simple Hausman-Wu test suggests that we cannot reject the null-hypothesis of
no di¤erence between our point estimate for forgetfulness (in columns 3 and 4 in Table
5). This is why we do not instrument for forgetfulnessin this section.
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In the top left gure, for example, it shows that the e¤ect of being nancially
constrainedhas a larger e¤ect on the number of self-disconnections (by ca 150%)
in the top quantiles than the bottom quantiles. The same is not true if we look
at the top right gure of Figure 5. It shows the impact estimate of forgetfulness
which shows a peak in the middle quantiles.
The bottom left and right gures show that coordination issues among
household members and unavailability of creditremain insignicant (and close
to zero) across all quantiles of self-disconnections. This suggests that coordi-
nation issuesand unavailability of creditare indeed of secondary importance
for why households self-disconnect.
5 Self-Disconnection: An Alternative Perspec-
tive
In the last section, we showed that the main driver of self-disconnection is
nancial constraints(and to a lesser extent forgetfulness).
In this section, we argue that  even if this suggests that it is likely to
be hard/expensive to reduce the total number of self-disconnections  it may
still be possible to reduce the negative impact of self-disconnections (at least
to some extent) by helping households to better smooth the number of self-
disconnections over the course of a year.
5.1 When should a household self-disconnect (if it has to
do so)?
The starting point for our discussion is the idea that from a rational perspective
households should self-disconnect whenever it hurts them the least.
What this suggests is that (in the absence of seasonal di¤erences in prices
and/or tastes) households should spread the total amount/total duration of
self-disconnection evenly over the course of a year that is, even if they face a
strong seasonal pattern in income ows/energy use. In the latter case they would
simply borrow/save to ensure that at any point they have the right amount of
cash available.
To see this more formally, suppose that all a household cares about is its
energy use (electricity + gas). Further, assume that a household requires a
xed amount of credit to avoid self-disconnection every month/season; that this
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amount is the same every month/season and that the only thing that varies
across months/seasons is disposable income.
One way to think about these assumptions is as follows: once we take into
account the higher costs for energy in the autumn/winter, households with
otherwise constant incomes over the course of a year26 are exposed to varying
disposable incomes to purchase a xed amount of top-up (with higher incomes
in the spring/summer and lower incomes in the autumn/winter).
Given these assumptions: how much credit will a household demand each
month/season? Or: how much will it self-disconnect? We can analyse these
problems without loss of generality using a simple two-season framework (see
e.g. Paxson, 1993) in which households maximise additively separable utility
such that:
max
P1
t=0 
2t[U(Coit;0) + U(C1it;1)] (3)
subject to
P1
t=0R
 2t(P0C0it + P1C1itR ) = Wi +
P1
t=0R
 2t(Y0i + Y1iR ) (4)
where Cjit is demand for credit of household i in season j in year t, Pj
represents the price of credit in season j in all years, Wi is initial nancial
wealth, and  is a seasonal discount rate. The term j is a season specic taste
parameter, which is assumed (for now) to be identical across households, and
Yji is disposable income of household i in season j.27
If it is assumed that R = 1, then utility maximisation yields two season-
specic levels of demand for credit for each household C0i and C

1i  that
do not vary across years. To derive closed-form expressions for consumption in
each season, we assume that utility has a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
form with a risk aversion parameter of a, such that U `(Cji;j) = j(Cji) a.
This assumption, together with the assumptions noted above, yields the
following expressions for demand for credit in each season:
C0i =
R
PoR+P1
[Y0i +
Y1i
R +Wi(
R2 1
R2 )] (5)
C1i =
R
PoR+P1
[Y0i +
Y1i
R +Wi(
R2 1
R2 )] (6)
where  = (1P00P1 )
 1
a
26A simple analysis of the corresponding data from the LCF suggests that this assumption is
fair irrespective of whether we look at disposable incomeor total household expenditure.
27We also assume that individuals can borrow and save at a constant seasonal interest rate
r=R-1. We will come back to this assumption later.
20
In each of the equations, the term within brackets is the same and represents
permanent income. Given that in our model self-disconnection is merely the
ip side of consumption  it is the (negative) di¤erence between the demand
for credit and the xed need to avoid self-disconnection and (for now) that
the duration of self-disconnections is constant over time, the two expressions
conrm our basic intuition:
1. In the absence of di¤erences in prices and/or tastes across seasons rational
households spread the number of self-disconnections evenly over the course
of a year and
2. Although income and wealth a¤ect the number of self-disconnections in
each season, they do not a¤ect how these self-disconnections are allocated
across seasons. That is, the timing of self-disconnections is independent
of the timing of income ows/energy use.28
5.2 Sub-optimal Self-Disconnection Behaviour?
A preliminary test of whether households do behave optimally and smooth the
number of self-disconnections evenly over the course of a year is by plotting
the probability that households self-disconnect for each month of the year (and
check if it is constant over time).
Figure 6a shows the result from this analysis29 (in which we estimated the
probabilities to self-disconnect by regressing whether a household self-disconnects
in a particular month on a set of month dummies, year dummies and household
xed e¤ects).
28One short-coming of our (one good) model is that it allows for households to demand/use
more credit in a given season than is necessary to avoid self-disconnection (which is implausi-
ble). To the extent, however, that what we are interested in is situations in which the optimal
demand for credit falls below the minimum necessary to avoid self-disconnection this property
has no bearing on the main insights of our model. We will discuss corner solutions later on.
29We use only households which have self-disconnected at least once in the past 4 years.
(So all estimated probabilities (relative to December) should be considered conditional in this
sense).
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Figure 6a: Regression Coe¢ cients  Figure 6b: Regression Coe¢ cients 
Self-disconnection Electricity + Gas expenditure
What we nd is that contrary to the prediction of our theoretical model
 there is a strong seasonal pattern in the probability that households self-
disconnect in a particular month (relative to the probability that they self-
disconnect in December): A simple F-test suggests that we can reject the null-
hypothesis of no seasonal patternat the 1% level of signicance.30
A preliminary test of whether the second implication of our model stands
up to the data is to compare the seasonal pattern in self-disconnection with the
seasonal pattern in energy expenditure. Figure 6b does exactly this: it plots the
coe¢ cients from a regression of householdstotal gas and electricity expenditure
in each month on a set of month dummies, year dummies and a set of controls.31
What we nd is a similar seasonal pattern in gas and electricity expenditure
as for the probability that households self-disconnect. In particular, we nd the
same local minima and maxima and spikes in March; April and July (albeit
less pronounced in the energy data).32 This suggests that again contrary to
the prediction of our simple model the timing of self-disconnections may not
be entirely independent of the timing of householdsincome ows/energy use.
5.3 Is there are real problem?
The conict between the optimal self-disconnection behaviour (as suggested by
our simple model) and the way people actually behave (as reected in the data)
rests on two critical assumptions:
30The F-statistic is 43.98. The corresponding p-value: <0.01
31For this analysis, we use data from the LCF/Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) from
2007-2009. It was not possible to extract and match the corresponding metering information.
32The most likely reason for the less pronounced seasonal pattern is measurement error in
the survey data (and the relatively small sample size).
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 The rst one is that there are no seasonal di¤erences in the price for credit
and/or tastes.33
 The second assumption is that self-disconnections last for the same period
of time over the course of a year.
If the price of credit is higher in the autumn/winter and/or households prefer
to self-disconnect in the autumn/winter to self-disconnecting in the spring/
summer, it can be optimal for households to not smooth their self-disconnections
evenly over the course of a year (but delay some of their self-disconnections until
later in the year).34
Similarly in case of the second assumption: if self-disconnections last longer
in the spring/summer than the autumn/winter, it is possible that we nd a
strong seasonal pattern in the probability that households self-disconnect even
if households do in fact optimally smooth the total amount/ total duration of
self-disconnection over the course of a year.
What this suggests is that our simple plots in the last section are not su¢ -
cient to establish that households top-up behaviour is sub-optimal. (After all,
even the co-movement with householdsincome ows/energy use may simply be
accidental).
In addition, it suggests that to actually establish that the pattern in self-
disconnection we nd is sub-optimal what we need to do is: show that it is
not driven by seasonal di¤erences in prices; tastes and/or the duration of self-
disconnections (but by the seasonal pattern in income ows/energy use instead).
5.4 Empirical Framework
One way of testing whether the seasonal pattern in self-disconnections in the
last section is due to seasonal di¤erences in prices; tastes and/or the duration of
self-disconnections or a seasonal pattern in income/energy use is by comparing
the probabilities that households self-disconnect in the autumn/winter when
households face a strong seasonal variation in income/energy use and when
they do not.
33Another possibility which we do not consider in our model is uncertainty. The evidence
in the next section, however, is at odds with this idea.
34Formally, the idea is that if P1 > P0 and/or 0>1, then = (1P0=0P1) 1=a > 1
which in turn implies that C0i =
R
PoR+P1
[Y0i +
Y1i
R
+Wi(
R2 1
R2
)] > C1i =
R
PoR+P1
[Y0i +
Y1i
R
+Wi(
R2 1
R2
)] (i.e. that consumption in the spring/summer is smaller than consumption in
the autumn/winter) which, in turn, suggests that the number of self-disconnections is higher
in the autumn/winter than in the spring/summer.
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The idea is that if the seasonal pattern in self-disconnections is driven by
variation in prices; tastes and/or the duration of self-disconnections, we would
expect to nd the same probabilities under both scenarios. The same is not
true if the seasonal pattern in self-disconnections is due to seasonal di¤erences
in income/energy use. In this case, we would expect a higher probability to
self-disconnect under the rst scenario than the second one.
Unfortunately, we do not observe the same households exposed to seasonal
changes in income/energy use and at the same time not exposed to seasonal
changes in income/energy use. One way of dealing with this is to compare the
probabilities to self-disconnect in the autumn/winter of households which are
exposed to seasonal changes in income/energy use and households which are not
(or much less) exposed to such changes.
The problem with this is that the di¤erence in probabilities between the two
groups of households may be due to reasons other than di¤erences in exposure
to seasonal variation in income/energy use  such as di¤erences in household
income, family size, geographical location etc.35 One way to deal with this is by
comparing the changes in the probabilities to self-disconnect from one season to
the next (rather than levels).
If the reason for the pattern in self-disconnections is due to di¤erences in
prices; tastes and/or the duration of self-disconnections  there is little rea-
son to expect that the probability to self-disconnect increases more in the au-
tumn/winter for households which are more exposed to seasonal changes in
income/energy use than for households which are less exposed to such changes
even if the two groups di¤er in terms of their background characteristics).
If, on the other hand, the seasonal pattern in self-disconnections is due to
seasonal di¤erences in income/energy use, we would expect to nd a stronger
increase in the probability to self-disconnect in the autumn/winter for house-
holds which are more exposed to seasonal changes in income/energy use than
for households which are less exposed to such changes.
5.5 Analysis
One way to implement the test outlined in the last section is by comparing the
changes in the probabilies to self-disconnect (with an electricity pre-payment
meter) of households which have a gas pre-payment meter and households paying
35As described in section 2.2.
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for their gas by means of a budgeting scheme.36
The idea is that: while expenditure on gas is highly seasonal for households
using a gas pre-payment meter, the same is not true for households paying for
their gas by means of a budgeting scheme. Figure 7a and 7b below illustrate
this:
Figure 7a: Energy Expenditure Gas- Figure 7b: Energy Expenditure Gas-
PPM Budgeting Scheme
The gures show the monthly changes in total gas and electricity expenditure
over the course of a year (relative to December) separately for household with
a gas pre-payment meter and households on a budgeting scheme.37 They show
that  in line with what we would expect  energy use is highly seasonal for
customers with a gas pre-payment meter, while it is relatively at for households
paying for their gas by means of a budgeting scheme.
We can now test whether the seasonal pattern in self-disconnection is di¤er-
ent between the two groups of households: Figures 8a and 8b do exactly this:
they plot the changes in the probability that households self-disconnect (with
their electricity pre-payment meter) for each month of the year separately for
households with a gas pre-payment meter and households paying for their gas
by means of a budgeting scheme.38
36Budgeting scheme includes: quarterly equal payment; monthly direct debit (same amount
each month); and mag card customers (with a set amount each week /fortnight/ month).
37The corresponding regression equation and quantitative estimates are provided in Appen-
dix B.
38The corresponding regression equation and quantitative estimates are provided in Appen-
dix B - again.
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Figure 8a: Self-Disconnection - Gas- Figure 8b: SelfDisconnection - Gas
PPM Budgeting Scheme
What we nd is that  in line with the idea that the seasonal pattern in
self-disconnection is driven (at least to some extent) by the seasonal pattern in
income/energy use households with a gas pre-payment meter exhibit a much
stronger seasonal pattern in self-disconnection with their electricity pre-payment
meter than households paying for their gas by means of a budgeting scheme. A
simple F-test shows that we can reject the null-hypothesis of identical seasonal
patterns at the 1% level of signicance.39
The identication assumption of our test is (of course) that in the absence of
the stronger seasonal pattern in income/energy use, the changes in the probabil-
ity to self-disconnect from spring/summer to autumn/winter would have been
the same for the two groups. In Appendix C, we provide a series of tests to
explore how plausible this assumption is. We come to the conclusion that it is
plausible and hence that our main test is meaningful.
6 Why do households fail to smooth SDs?
In the last section, we showed that households exhibit a strong seasonal pattern
in self-disconnections. In addition, we showed that this pattern is sub-optimal by
showing that it is not driven by seasonal di¤erences in prices; tastes and/or the
duration of self-disconnections (but seasonal di¤erences in income ows/energy
use instead).
This suggests that we might be able to improve the self-disconnection situ-
ation of households  by helping them to better smooth the number of self-
disconnections over the course of a year. In this section, we make a rst
39Detailed quantitative estimates can again be found in Appendix B.
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step in this direction by exploring why households fail to smooth their self-
disconnections.
6.1 A possible explanation: Preference Reversals
One possible explanation why many households fail to smooth the number of
self-disconnections over the course of a year is: preference reversals.
The way preference reversals can a¤ect householdsability to smooth self-
disconnections is by a¤ecting their ability to save: if households fail to save in
the spring/summer, they will be more exposed to the seasonal dip in disposable
income/seasonal increase in energy use in the autumn/winter which, in turn,
a¤ects their probability to self-disconnect.40
The basic idea of preference reversals is that from a long-run perspective,
individuals with preference reversals tend to have one set of preferences but when
the future arrives, tend to have a di¤erent set of preferences. It is straightforward
to see how this time-inconsistencyin preferences can a¤ect householdsability
to save in the spring/summer:
While in the autumn/winter households might have a strong preference to
save in the spring/summer to avoid (excessive) self-disconnection in the following
autumn/winter, as soon as the spring/summer arrives their preferences change
and instead of saving they keep on consuming (making themselves vulnerable
to self-disconnection in the following autumn/winter).
There are several possible reasons why individuals may exhibit preference
reversals. One is changes in the saliency of costs and benets (Akerlof, 1991):
the idea is that in the autumn/winter the benets from saving during the
spring/summer loom large, while the costs seem small. But as the spring/summer
approaches, individuals become increasingly aware of the costs of saving, while
the benets become increasingly less clear.
Preference reversals have been shown to be at the core of a series of economic
puzzles ranging from why students tend to start too late to prepare for their
exams (Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2001); to why individuals often save too little
for their retirement (Laibson, 1997); to why they tend to fail to go to the gym
as often as they would like to (Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2005); to why they
tend to eat more than is good for them (Schar¤, 2009).41
40This assumes that households which self-disconnnect (frequently) tend to be borrowing
constrained - which seems reasonable given the high correlation between nancial constraints
and the number of self-disconnections (see section 4.3).
41Basu and Wong (2009) provide a theoretical model which incorporates preference reversals
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6.2 Testing for Preference Reversals
The simplest way to test whether preference reversals (also) a¤ect households
ability to smooth self-disconnections over the course of a year is by regressing
the di¤erence in the number of self-disconnections in the autumn/winter and
spring/summer on a measure of preference reversals.
If the seasonal pattern in the probability that households self-disconnect
is driven by preference reversals, we would expect that households in which
the household member in charge of purchasing top-up su¤ers from preference
reversals are more likely to self-disconnect primarily in the autumn/winter.
The corresponding model takes the following form:
DSDi = 0 + 1PRi + 2Zi + i (7)
where DSDi is the di¤erence (in logs) of self-disconnections in the au-
tumn/winter and spring/summer of household i in the years 2007-2010.42 PRi
is a variable capturing preference reversals (of the household member who is in
charge of purchasing top-up); Zi a vector of control variables and  the corre-
sponding regression coe¢ cients. i is an error term.
6.3 A Note on the data
As is common in the literature, we measure preference reversals by:
1. Asking individuals (in charge of purchasing top-up) to choose between
receiving a smaller reward immediately and receiving a larger reward with
some delay and then
2. Asking the same question with the same rewards but at a further time
frame (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Benzion et al, 1989).
Our sample questions are as follows: would you prefer to receive £ 350 guar-
anteed today or £ 400 guaranteed in 1 month? and: would you prefer to receive
£ 350 guaranteed in 6 months or £ 400 guaranteed in 7 months?43
in a seasonal model of consumption (similar to the one we present in section 5.1). They show
that analytically  this simple extension entails a strong correlation between the timing of
income ows and the timing of consumption (i.e. in our case, between the timing of income
ows/energy use and the timing of demand for credit/the timing of self-disconnections).
42We calculate an average number of self-disconnections for the spring/summer months and
autumn/winter months before taking the di¤erence (where the averages take into account
the number of spring/summer months and autumn/winter months a household had its pre-
payment meter).
43 In both cases, if respondents chose £ 350, we asked them the same question with £ 450
(rather than £ 400) as alternative amount. If respondents still chose £ 350, we asked them
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Following Asharf et al (2006), we call the rst question the near-termframe
and the second question the distantframe choice. We interpret the choice of
the immediate reward in either of the frames as impatient.
If an individual chooses the immediate reward in the near-term frame and the
delayed reward in the distant frame we say he/she displays preference reversals.
In particular, we refer to this case as hyperbolic(since the implied discount
rate in the near term frame is higher than that of the distant frame).
Table 6 below describes the cell densities for the di¤erent possible outcomes.
Indi¤erent between 350 in 6m & X in 7m
Patient Sw Impat. M impat. Total
X<350 350<X<400 X>450
Indi¤. Patient X<400 250 45 29 324
bw 350 Sw Impat. 400<X<450 35 21 12 68
now & M impat. X>450 57 11 42 110
X in 1m Total 342 77 83 502
Table 6: Summary statistics Hypothetical Choice Experiment
The table shows that approximately 21 percent of individuals in our sample
are hyperbolic, that is, these individuals are more patient over future trade-o¤s
than current trade-o¤s; 16 percent show preference reversals in the opposite
direction (being less patient over future trade-o¤s than current ones); and 63
percent of individuals show no preference reversals.
6.4 Analysis
Table 7 shows the results from our estimation of (7)  linking the timing of
self-disconnection and our measure of (hyperbolic) preference reversals.44
how much would we have to o¤er you to take the higher amount. Please note: there was a
break of approx. 15 minutes between the near-termframe and the distantframe.
44We keep only households in sample which have self-disconnected at least twice in the
last 4 years  since only this way we can infer something about their ability to smooth
consumption/self-disconnections from their self-disconnection behaviour. We delete 122 ob-
servations in the process. As before, we estimate our model with and without survey weights.
We nd that, again, our main conclusions do not change if we use survey weights. In fact, our
point estimates are almost identical.
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OLS w/o controls OLS with controls
Hyperbolic 0.41 0.39**
(0.18) (0.18)
Impatient now vs 1 m -0.39 -0.41**
(0.17) (0.18)
Distance from Nearest Outlet -0.03 -0.03
(0.07) (0.07)
Socio-economic Controls No Yes
Table 7: Regression Analysis of (2) - Stat
Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *
What we nd is that in line with our hypothesis households in which the
individual in charge of purchasing top-up su¤ers from (hyperbolic) preferences
reversals are more likely to self-disconnect primarily in the autumn/winter than
households in which the person in charge does not su¤er from (hyperbolic)
preference reversals.
Specically, what we nd is that su¤ering from (hyperbolic) preference re-
versals (by the household member in charge of purchasing top-up) is associated
with a statistically signicant 40% increase in the ratio of the number of self-
disconnections in the autumn/winter compared to the spring/summer.
This nding is robust to di¤erent specications of (7). In addition, we can
rule out several alternative explanations for our nding  such as noise; an
inability to understand our survey questions; the timing of income ows as
documented in Appendix D.
7 Exploring Di¤erent Policy Responses
In the last section, we provided evidence which suggests that one important
driver of householdssub-optimal self-disconnection behaviour is preference re-
versals.
In this section, we discuss di¤erent ways to address this problem. We focus
on two broad classes of policies which can help to mediate the negative e¤ect of
preference reversals on householdsability to smooth their self-disconnections.
They are:
 An increase in awareness of preference reversals in the context of self-
disconnections and
30
 Providing households (which are aware of the problem) with a commit-
ment savings device to lock intheir optimal behaviour.
The idea of the rst class of policies is that if household members are aware
of their preference reversals, they can try to commit themselves irreversibly in
the autumn/winter to a particular behaviour in the spring/summer to so avoid
deviating from their (long-term) plans.
This can be done either by the household member in charge of purchasing
top-up  in which case we speak of sophisticationas a mediating factor (see
e.g. ODonoghue and Rabin, 2001) or by his/her partner  in which case we
speak of interferenceas a mediating factor (see e.g. Ashraf, 2009 or Brutscher,
2011).
In both cases, however, we need that household members have the possibility
to lock intheir behaviour and so prevent either themselves or their partners
from spending their savings before the autumn/winter. One way households
can do this is by means of a comitment savings device:
A commitment savings device is a savings device which restricts access to
ones savings to certain times of the year (e.g. the autumn/winter) and/or to
certain uses of ones savings (e.g. the purchase of top-up) and so allows one to
lock inones behaviour.45
7.1 A Two Step Approach
One way of exploring whether the main challenge for policy makers is to increase
awareness about preference reversals in the context of self-disconnections or
to (also) provide households with a commitment savings device is by testing
whether sophistication and/or interference has/have a mediating e¤ect on
preference reversals.
The idea is that if we nd that sophisticationand/or interferencehas/have
a mediating e¤ect, this tells us that the main challenge for policy makers is to
raise awareness among those households which are not aware of the negative
role of preference reversals yet (when it comes to smoothing self-disconnections
over the course of a year).
45An example of a commitment savings device in a context similar to ours is fuel stamps
in Northern Ireland. Fuel stamps are small pieces of paper which can be purchased at specied
outlets (in Northern Ireland), collected on fuel stamps savings cards, and used to pay for ones
oil bill in the autumn/winter. Because the stamps are non-refundable and can only be used
for the purchase of heating oil, they allow household members to prevent themselves/their
partners from spending their savings on anything else but heating oil. For more details on
fuel stamps see Brutscher (2011)
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If, on the other hand, we nd that even households which are sophisticated
and/or satisfy the conditions for interferencefail to deal with their preference
reversals in an e¤ective way, this suggests that the main challenge for policy
makers is to provide households with a commitment savings device possibly
on top of increasing awareness among households which are (still) unaware.
One way to implement this test is by dividing households into several di¤er-
ent groups depending on their level of sophisticationand interferenceand
to then estimate (7) separately for these groups of households. The idea is to so
check whether the e¤ect of preference reversals is (signicantly) stronger/weaker
for any of the groups of households. There are, however, several problems with
this approach:
First, there may be more mediating factors in our data than sophistication
and/or interferencelike gender; age; etc which we would like to capture.
Second, even if sophistication and/or interference were the only two such
factors, the fact that we have more than one (potential) mediating factor makes
it di¢ cult to separate the data into groups of households without losing a lot of
explanatory power.46
Finally, although the measures of sophisticationand interferencewe use
for our analysis are the best ones available to us, they are likely to not fully cap-
ture the two concepts. This makes it (again) di¢ cult to separate our data into
groups of households without losing a lot of explanatory power in the process.
A more promising approach to test for the mediating e¤ect of sophistication
and/or interferenceemploys a two step approach:
1. In the rst step, we use a nite mixture approach to divide the sample into
two groups of households and to estimate (7) separately for both groups
2. In the second step, we then test whether the two groups di¤er in terms of
sophisticationand/ or interference.
The idea of the rst step is to (simultaneously) divide households into two
groups of households and test whether preference reversals have a di¤erent e¤ect
for group 1 and group 2. The idea of the second step is given that preference
reversals have a di¤erent e¤ect in the two groups to check what mediates the
e¤ect in one of the two groups (but not the other).
This two-step approach has the advantage that it can account for more than
the two (potentially) mediating factors which we have identied; it allows us to
46What makes this problem worse is that one of our mediating factors is multi-categorical.
This means that we would have to divide our sample into even more sub-samples.
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test for sophisticationand interferenceusing the largest possible sample size;
and it minimises the problem of noise in our measures of sophisticationand/or
interference.47
7.2 First Step
The main challenge of our approach is how to divide households into two groups
(in the rst step). We deal with this by means of a statistical trick:
The idea is that we can get an increasingly precise idea of group membership
by going through an iterative procedure in which we choose the parameters of
our model and group membership so as to maximise the t of our model.48
47Regarding the last point, please note that our point estimates of the mediating e¤ect of
sophistication and/or interference does not depend on our measures of these variables.
48Consider Do and Batzoglous (2008) simple coin-ipping experiment in which we are given
a pair of coins A and B of unknown biases, Xa and Xb, respectively (that is, on any given ip,
coin A will land on heads with probability Xa and tails with probability 1-Xa and similarly for
coin B). Our goal is to estimate X=(Xa, Xb) by repeating the following procedure ve times:
randomly choose one of the two coins (with equal probability), and perform ten independent
coin tosses with the selected coin. Thus the entire procedure involves a total of 50 coin tosses.
During our experiment, suppose that we keep track of two vectors x=(x1,x2...) and z(z1,
z2...) where x is the number of heads observed during the ith set of tosses, and z is the identity
of the coin used during the ith set of tosses. Parameter estimation in this setting is known
as the complete data case in that the values of all relevant random variables in our model
(that is, the result of each coin ip and the type of coin used for each ip) are known. We
estimate Xa and Xb by means of ML (roughly speaking, the ML method assess the quality of
a statistical model based on the probability it assigns to the observed data).
Now consider a more challenging variant of the parameter estimation problem in which we
are given the recorded head counts x but not the identies z of the coins used for each set of
tosses. We refer to z as hidden variables or latent factors. Parameter estimation in this new
setting is known as the incomplete data case. This time, computing proportions of heads for
each coin is no longer possible, because we dont know the coin used for each set of tosses.
However, if we had some way of completing the data (in our case guessing correctly which coin
was used in each of the ve sets), the we could reduce parameter estimation for this problem
with incomplete data to maximum likelihood estimation with complete data.
One iterative scheme for obtaining completions could work as follows: starting from some
initial parameters X=(Xa, Xb) determine for each of the ve sets whether coin A or coin B
was more likely to have generated the observed ips (using the current parameter estimates).
Then, assume these completions (that is guessed coin assignments) to be correct, and apply the
regular maximum likelihood estimation procure to get Xt+1. Finally, repeat these two steps
until convergence. As the estimated model improves so too will the quality of the resulting
completions.
The expectation maximisation algorithm is a renement on this basic idea. Rather than
picking the single most likely completion of the missing coin assignments on each iteration,
the expectation maximisation algorithm computes probabilities for each possible completion
of the missing data, using the current parameters X. These probabilities are used to create
a weighted training set consisting of all possible completion of the data. Finally, a modied
version of ML estimation that deals with weighted training examples provides new parameter
estimates Xt+1. By using weighted training examples rather than choosing the single best
completion, the expectation maximisation algorithm accounts for the condence of the model
in each completion of the data. In summary, the EM algorithm alternates between the steps of
guessing a probability distribution over completions of missing data given the current model
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The way we implement this approach formally is as a mixture of two normal
regressions or switching regressions:
Yi = Xi1 + "1i with probability  (8)
Yi = Xi2 + "2i with probability (1  ) (9)
where "1i and "2i are mutually independent, iid normal with zero means,
and variance 21 and 
2
2, respectively.
7.3 Analysis
The results of estimating (8) and (9)  using an Expectation Maximisation
Algorithm49 are contained in columns 2 and 3 of Table 8.
OLS Spec. FM Group1 FM Group2
Sample Share X 0.69 0.31
Hyperbolic 0.39** 0.25 0.89***
(0.39) (0.22) (0.28)
Impatient now vs 1 m -0.41 0.16 -1.75***
(0.18) (0.21) (0.60)
Distance from Nearest Outlet -0.03 -0.10 -0.09
(0.07) (0.09) (0.14)
Socio-economic Controls Yes Yes Yes
 0.73 0.50 0.46
Table 8: Mixture Analysis - Statistically Signicant
at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *
The table shows that about two thirds of the households in our sample are
associated with group 1 (69%) and about one-third (31%) with group 2. In
addition, the table shows that the estimated standard error50 of the two groups
are both (0.50 and 0.46) smaller than their OLS counterpart (0.73).
This suggests that  in line with the idea that some variables mediate the
e¤ect of preference reversals  there are two regression regimes (and that the
(known as E step) and then re-estimating the model parameters using the completions (known
as the M-Step).
49For a formal exposition of the model see Appendix D.
50Also known as Root Mean Square Error.
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mixture procedure is not simply creamskimming, or just putting the outliers
in one group and those observations on or near the regression line in the other
group).51
As for our main hypothesis test, the table shows that while most other coef-
cients are remarkably similar across groups preference reversals have a di¤er-
ent e¤ect in the two groups: whereas preference reversals are associated with no
statistically signicant increase in the seasonal di¤erence in self-disconnections
in group 1; they are associated with a signicant increase (by 89%) in group2.
7.4 Second Step
In the last section(s) we showed that there are two distinct groups of households
in our sample. In addition, we showed that preference reversals have a much
stronger e¤ect on householdsability to smooth consumption in the second group
than in the rst one.
We can now test our hypothesis that the reason for the di¤erence between
the two groups is the presence/absence of sophisticationand/or interference.
We do this by classifying households as either a member of group 1 or group 2
using the (posterior) probability from the rst step52 and then regressing group
membership on a set of variables  including proxies for sophistication and
interference.
The basic idea is that if the di¤erence in parameter estimates in the last
section are due to di¤erences in sophisticationand/or interference, we would
expect to nd that individuals in group 1 are more sophisticatedand/or more
likely to be subject to interferencethan individuals in group 2.
Formally, we estimate:
GMSi = 0 + 1Ii + 2Zi + i (13)
where GMSi is group membership of household i. Ii is a vector summarising
our main variables (measuring sophisticationand interference); Zi a vector of
control variables and  the corresponding regression coe¢ cients. i is an error
term.
51More evidence in support of the existence of two regimes is provided in Appendix C.
52We will use di¤erent cut-o¤ points (in probabilities) to ensure the robustness of our
ndings.
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7.5 A Note on the data
Similar to Ameriks (2007), we measure the degree of sophistication (of the house-
hold member in charge of purchasing top-up) by presenting individuals with the
following hypothetical scenario:
Suppose that you win 10 vouchers, each of which can be used
for an evening out. On each such evening, you and a companion
will get an unlimited budget for food and drinks at a place of your
choosing. There will be no cost to you. The vouchers are available
for immediate use, starting today and there is an absolute guarantee
that they will be honoured by any place you select, if they are used
within the next two years. However, if they are not used within this
two year period, any vouchers that remain are valueless.
and then asking: how many of the vouchers would you ideally like to use
in the rst year? and: would you want to make this choice irreversible? The
idea of the second question is that if a household member is aware of his/her
preference reversal (i.e. is sophisticated), he/she will want to tie his/her hands
to avoid that he/she departs from his/her long-term plan of action (once the
time comes).
To measure the degree of interference, we use an approach suggested by
Brutscher (2011). The idea is that in order for a partner to be able to inuence
the behaviour of the household member in charge of purchasing top-up, two
conditions need to hold: i) the partner must display a stronger preference to
smooth consumption/self-disconnection and ii) he/she must have a stronger
bargaining position.
One way to capture the two conditions is by asking households who gives
higher priority to saving for heating in the autumn/winter? and for expenses
other than heating who decides on when to buy expensive things?. We then cap-
ture the e¤ect of a household satisfying both conditions by using an interaction
term between the two variables (which takes a value of 1if the partner gives
more priority to saving and also tends to decide on when to buy expensive
thingsand 0otherwise).53
53As discussed in Brutscher (2011), if the household member in charge of purchasing top-up
is aware of his/her preference reversals, it may not be necessary for his/her partner to have a
stronger bargaining position than him/her (to exercise interference). To test this possibility,
we redid the entire following analysis focusing only on di¤erences in preferences. We arrived
at the same conclusions.
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7.6 Analysis
Table 9 below provides the results from our estimation of (8).
Pr[Group 1] 0:5 Pr[Group 2] 0:66 Pr[Group 2] 0:75
Hyperbolic 0.04* 0.07*** 0.05**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Interaction 0.02 0.10 0.05
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
Higher Priority -0.01 0.09 -0.06
(0.03) (0.09) (0.08)
Who Decides -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Socio-economic Controls Yes54 Yes Yes
Table 9: Regression Analysis of (8) - Statistically Signicant
at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *
Column (1) shows the results if we classify households with a (posterior)
probability of  0:5 as members of group 1; column (2) shows the results if we
classify households with a (posterior) probability  0:66 as members of group1;
and column (3) the results if we classify households with a (posterior) probability
 0:75 as members of group1.
What we nd is that independent of how we classify households house-
holds in the rst group are signicantly more likely to be sophisticatedthan
households in the second one which suggests that being aware of ones own
preference reversals is a big step towards addressing the problem.55
In contrast, households in the rst groups are no more likely to satisfy the
conditions of interference. This suggests that household members not su¤ering
from preference reversals are not as good in mediating the negative consequences
of their partnerpreference reversals (and that policy makers may have to pro-
vide them with a commitment savings device).
54None of the control variables are statistically signicant - suggesting that sophistication
is the only mediating factor in our dataset.
55An alternative explanation for the presence of two regimes (in Table 8) and our ndings in
Table 9 is that some households live further away from the nearest outlet selling top-up than
others. To the extent that distance matters more in the autumn/winter (when the weather
tends to be bad) than the spring/summer, this may a¤ect our ndings in Tables 8 and 9. It
is important to note, however, that we control for distance from the nearest outlet in both
stages (FMM and analysis of posterior) - and in neither case nd a signicant e¤ect.
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One possible explanation for this nding is that household members who are
sophisticatedare more likely to have accepted their weaknessand so need
a less strict mechanism/commitment device to lock up their savings  than
household members which are (only) subject to interference.
8 Conclusion and Policy Implications
In this paper, we revisited the problem of self-disconnection among electricity
pre-payment customers in Great Britain.
In the rst half of the paper we discussed the extent and drivers of self-
disconnection: using metering data from 2.3 million pre-payment households
from British Gas and data from a telephone survey of 502 (randomly selected)
households with a pre-payment meter, we showed that:
1. The majority of households with a pre-payment meter do not self-disconnect
(78%); 12% of households tend to self-disconnect once; approx. 3% of
households tend to self-disconnect more often than 4 times.
2. Proxying the duration of self-disconnections, we also found that most self-
disconnections (>62%) last for less than one day; between 72% and 82%
of self-disconnections last for less than two days.
3. Finally, we showed that the main driver of self-disconnections is nan-
cial constraintswhich suggests that reducing the total number of self-
disconnections is likely to be di¢ cult/expensive.
In the second half of the paper, we discussed an alternative/complementary
approach to reducing the total number of self-disconnections: we explored
whether it is possible to improve the timing of households self-disconnection
behaviour.
We proceeded in three steps:
1. In the rst step, we argued that householdsself-disconnection behaviour
over time tends to be sub-optimal.
2. In the second step, we provided evidence which suggests that one im-
portant driver for households sub-optimal self-disconnection behaviour is
(hyperbolic) preference reversals.
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3. In the nal step, we discussed several possible policy responses to prefer-
ence reversals (in the context of smoothing self-disconnections over time)
and concluded that an e¤ective policy is likely to include an initiative to
increase awareness of preference reversals and possibly the provision of a
commitment savings device.
Taking this work forward, the main tasks will include: i) designing an aware-
ness campaign; ii) a commitment savings device and iii) a research design which
allows to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of these policies with regard to households
ability to smooth self-disconnections over the course of a year/with regard to
reducing the negative e¤ect of self-disconnections.
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10 Appendix A
Table 10 below provides summary statistics for our survey by strata.
Variable Strata 1 Strata 2 Strata 3 Strata 4
N 126 125 126 125
Age 45.65 43.68 41.67 43.61
(13.87) (13.51) (12.06) (12.31)
Gender 0.67 0.49 0.66 0.67
(Female=1) (0.47) (0.50) (0.48) (0.47)
Marital Status 0.34 0.46 0.39 0.35
(Single=1) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48)
Income 161 181 219 187
(Weekly) (158.81) (157.42) (166.01) (148.86)
Labour Market Status 0.47 0.54 0.54 0.44
(Active=1) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Household Size 2.73 2.50 2.56 2.94
(1.43) (1.71) (1.42) (1.61)
Number of Children 0.90 0.82 0.90 1.09
(1.18) (1.24) (1.06) (1.30)
Type of House 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.12
(detached=1) (0.24) (0.32) (0.27) (0.33)
Rent 0.74 0.81 0.70 0.75
(Rent=1) (0.44) (0.40) (0.46) (0.44)
Table 10: Summary Statistics - by Strata.
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11 Appendix B
In section (5.5) we showed that the seasonal pattern in self-disconnection is
more pronounced among households that face a strong seasonal pattern in in-
come/energy use than among households that do not face such a strong pattern
in income/energy use.
Here we provide the corresponding quantiatitve estimates (and F-tests). The
underlying regression models take the following form:
Aimt = m + 
F
mGPPMit + GPPMit + Xit + "imt (14)
for energy expenditure (Aimt) of household i in month m of year t - where
the coe¢ cients m capture month e¤ects for households paying for their gas by
means of a budgeting scheme and Fm the additional month e¤ects for households
which have a gas pre-payment meter;  captures the di¤erence in the base level
of expenditure - and
SDimt = m + 
F
mZit + Zit + i + uimt (15)
for self-disconnection (SDimt) of household i in month m of year t - where
the coe¢ cient m captures month e¤ects for households paying for their gas by
means of a budgeting scheme; and Fm captures the additional month e¤ects for
households with a gas pre-payment meter.
To allow for di¤erent (base) levels of self-disconnections between the two
groups of households, we include a dummy variable equal to one if a house-
hold is exposed to seasonal changes in income/ energy use and zero otherwise
(again).  captures the corresponding di¤erence in (base) levels. Finally, we in-
clude individual xed e¤ects (i) to control for time-invariant di¤erences across
individuals.
Table 11 provides the results from estimating (14) and (15):
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Income/Energy Use Self-Disconnection
Month Month*PPMgas Month Month*PPMgas
Jan 16.18 -8.98 -0.0057* 0.0023
(14.79 16.14 (0.0033) (0.0034)
Feb 6.17 -7.85 -0.0064* 0.0033
(15.96) (17.21) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Mar 2.03 -1.51 0.0036 -0.0028
(15.95) (17.28) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Apr 0.15 -19.30 -0.0059* 0.0004
(15.33) (16.90) (0.0033) (0.0034)
May 5.42 -28.22* -0.0025 -0.0049*
(14.82) (16.29) (0.0033) (0.0034)
June 14.66 -41.38** 0.0020 -0.0064*
(17.96) (19.23) (0.0033) (0.0034)
July -5.13 -30.66** 0.0010 -0.0074**
14.08 (15.76) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Aug 2.45 -35.51** 0.0017 -0.0073**
(14.10) (15.67) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Sep 13.02 -40.72*** 0.0005 -0.0027
13.94 (15.42) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Oct -6.96 -6.38 -0.0028 0.0017
(15.36) 16.61 (0.0033) (0.0034)
Nov 12.68 16.61 0.0005 0.0042
(13.90) (15.36) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Table 11: Quantative Estimates of FNX and FNX -
Statsitically Singicant at *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%
The numbers under the column monthare the month e¤ects for households
with no pre-payment meter. The numbers under the column monthPPMare
the additional month e¤ects for households which do have a gas pre-payment
meter  and therefore represent the di¤erence in monthly income/energy use
and self-disconnections between the two groups of households.
Table 12 provides a series of F-tests to test the statistical signicance of the
di¤erences in seasonal patterns in the two groups.
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Dependent Variable Test
Income/Energy Use Test 1: no month e¤ect - gas F=9.05
pre-payment meter p<0.01
Test 2: no month e¤ect - gas F=0.61
budgeting scheme p=0.82
Test 3: month e¤ects F=1.57
identical p=0.10
Self-Disconnections Test 1: no month e¤ect - gas F=43.75
pre-payment meter p<0.01
Test 2: no month e¤ect - gas F=2.39
budgeting scheme p=0.01
Test 3: month e¤ects F=3.00
identical p<0.01
Table 12: F-Tests of Seasonal Patterns
Tests 1 and 4 in Table 13 show that the month e¤ects (m+Fm and m+
F
m)
in our income and self-disconnection equation are jointly signicant  and so
that for households with a gas pre-payment meter both the seasonal patterns in
income/energy use and the seasonal pattern in the probability to self-disconnect
are (not only visible but also) statistically signicant.
Test 2 shows that for households without a gas pre-payment meter the
month e¤ects (m) are jointly insignicant (which is in line with our hypothesis
that there is no seasonal pattern in income/energy use). When it comes to the
probability to self-disconnect, on the other hand, we cannot exclude that (also)
households without a gas pre-payment meter display a seasonal pattern in the
probability to self-disconnect (Test 3).
What is important to note, however, is that despite the fact that we nd
a seasonal pattern in the probability to self-disconnect for households with a
gas pre-payment meter and households with no gas pre-payment meter, we
nd strong evidence that the two patterns are not identical (Test 6). Instead,
the pattern for households with a gas pre-payment meter is signicantly more
pronounced than the one for households without a gas pre-payment meter.
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12 Appendix C
In this section, we discuss several tests of the identication assumption in section
(5.5).
12.1 Robustness Test 1: Identication Assumption prices
and/or tastes
One of the assumptions we tested in section 5.5 is that the seasonal pattern
in self-disconnections is not driven by seasonal di¤erences in the duration of
self-disconnections.
If self-disconnections last longer in the spring/summer than the autumn/
winter, it is possible that we nd a strong seasonal pattern in the probability
that households self-disconnect in a particular month even if households do
(in fact) smooth consumption/the total amount of self-disconnection over the
course of a year.
In this section, we provide complementary evidence to the ndings in section
(5.5) by showing that there are (indeed) no seasonal di¤erences in the duration
of self-disconnections: in Figure 9a and 9b below, we plot the distribution of
when households top-up their meters after (being predicted to) having self-
disconnected separately for spring/summer and autumn/winter.
Figure 9a: Duration of Self-Disconnection Figure 9b: Duration of Self-Disconnection
Spring/Summer Autumn/Winter
What we nd is an almost identical pattern in the two seasons: The gures
show that in both seasons the large majority of self-disconnections last for
less than 1 day (with households topping-up their meter on the same day they are
predicted to have run out of credit); between 72% and 82% of self-disconnections
last less than 2 days.
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The similarity between the two plots is at odds with the idea that the sea-
sonal pattern in self-disconnections (and, hence, the comovement between the
probability that households self-disconnect and their income ows/energy use)
is due to di¤erences in the duration of self-disconnections across seasons.
12.2 Robustness Test 2: Identication Assumption prices
and/or tastes
The second key identication assumption underlying our analysis in section (5.5)
is that prices and/or seasonal preferences are unrelated to whether households
have a gas pre-payment meter or not.
If households with a gas pre-payment meter face a stronger increase in the
price for credit/to avoid self-disconnection in the autumn/winter than house-
holds on a budgeting scheme, then the stronger increase in the number of self-
disconnections (for this group) is entirely consistent with the idea that the sea-
sonal pattern in self-disconnections is due to seasonal di¤erences in prices.
Similarly, if households with a gas pre-payment meter have a stronger pref-
erence to self-disconnect in the autumn/winter than households on a budgeting
scheme, then the stronger increase in the number of self-disconnections among
households with a gas pre-payment meter is entirely consistent with the idea
that the seasonal pattern in self-disconnections is due to di¤erences in tastes.
Figures 10a and 10b show, however, that both possibilities are at odds with
the data: Figure 10a plots the (average)56 gas tari¤ for households with a gas
pre-payment meter and households on a budgeting scheme from 2007 to 2010.57
The gure shows that the tari¤s for the two groups are highly correlated and
provides no evidence for a stronger increase in tari¤s in the autumn/winter for
households with a gas pre-payment meter.
56Taking into account geographic di¤erences in tari¤s.
57To facilitate comparison, we normalise 2007 tari¤s for both groups to 100.
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Figure 10a: Tari¤ Gas PPM cust. Figure 10b: Probabs. Gas PPM cust.
and Gas BS customers and Gas BS customers
Figure 10b plots the probability i) that a household head in our sample is
unemployed; ii) that he/she is employed part-time; and iii) that one or more
children live in his/her household  separately for households with a gas pre-
payment meter and households on a budgeting scheme.
The gure shows that for all three variables the patterns (in probabilities)
are similar for households with a gas pre-payment meter and households on a
budgeting scheme: that is, we nd no evidence that households with a gas pre-
payment meter show a stronger increase in the probability to be unemployed;
working part-time; or to have children in the autumn/winter than households
on a budgeting scheme.
This suggests that it is rather unlikely that these households have a stronger
preference/taste to self-disconnect in the autumn/winter because they tend to
spend less time at home during the autumn/winter. Similarly, it suggests that
it is unlikely that households with a gas pre-payment meter have a stronger
preference/taste to self-disconnect in the autumn/winter  because they are
less vulnerable than households on a budgeting scheme.
12.3 Robustness Test 3: Identication Assumption Dif-
ferences in the Number of Self-Disconnections
Another (implicit) assumption underlying our analysis in section (5.5) is that
households on a budgeting scheme do self-disconnect.
If households on a budgeting scheme do not self-disconnect/self-disconnect
rarely (e.g. because they are better o¤ than households with a gas pre-payment
meter) this implies independently from the true driver of the seasonal pattern
in the probability to self-disconnect a at(ter) pattern in the probability that
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households self-disconnect.
To test this possibility, we re-run our analysis (from sections 5.5) this time
using only households which have self-disconnected at least four times over the
course of the past 4 years. The ndings from this analysis are presented in
Figure 11a and Figure 11b below.
Figure 11a: SD+4 -Gas-PPM Figure 11b: SD+4 -Gas Budgeting
Customers Scheme
What we nd is the same, atter pattern in the probability that households
self-disconnect (over the course of a year) among households on a budgeting
scheme than households with a gas pre-payment meter as before.
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13 Appendix D
In this section, we give a formal exposition of our nite mixture model and
provide several specication tests.
13.1 Specication Finite Mixture
The incomplete, or observed, data likelihood of our model is then given by:58
f(Yi) =
p
221
exp
n
  (Yi Xi1)2
221
o
+ 1 p
222
exp
n
  (Yi Xi2)2
222
o
(10)
To write the complete-data likelihood, we have to dene the indicator vari-
able dij where di1=1 if the observation is associated with the rst group, 0
otherwise, and di2=1 (in our two-group case, really 1   di1=1) if the observa-
tion is associated with the second group, 0 otherwise.
The problem is that as discussed d is not/or only imperfectly observed.
This means that d must be considered a random variable and that the complete-
data density function is given by:
f(Yi) =
p
221
exp
n
  (Yi Xi1)2
221
od1i 
1 p
222
exp
n
  (Yi Xi2)2
222
o1 d1i
(11)
To estimate (11), we can use a two-step (iterative) procedure called the
Expectation Maximisation Algorithm: in the rst step, we replace d by its ex-
pectation given the data. This expectation is given by E(di1jYi) = (1)[P (di1 =
0jYi)] + (0)[P (di1 = 0jYi)]P (di1 = 1jYi).
The expected value can then be evaluated using Bayesrule:
P (d1i = 1jYi) = P (d1i=1)P (Y1ijd1i=1)P2
i=1(Pij=1)P (Yijdij=1)
= fi1fi1+(1 )fi2 = wi1 (12)
In the second step, we substitute the expected values/weights from the rst
step into the log of our complete-data likelihood and maximise it with respect
to the unknown parameters. We then use the resulting estimates to update the
expectations in (12), and hence the probability that a household belongs to one
of the two groups of households which gives us a new set of estimates of the
unknown parameters.
58These densities comprise the logarithm of the complete-data likelihood function that is
given by: lnL =
Pn
i=1

di1(ln    ln fi1) + (1  di1)(ln(1  ) + ln fi2)
	
where fi1 and fi2
are the respective normal density functions.
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We repeat this procedure until no improvement in t of our model (by fur-
ther updating the probability/weight estimates and/or parameter estimates) is
possible.59
13.2 Number of components
The rst set of checks (re-)examines the number of components. We initially
investigate a FMM specication with two heterogeneous groups. Then we test to
determine whether one, two or three components better represent the underlying
relationships. The test criteria for each model are reported in Table 13 while
the resulting FMM estimates of being hyperbolic can be seen in Table 14.
We use several criteria in selecting the best model: AIC/BIC and appropri-
ate mechanism of the estimation approach. The AIC/BIC reveal that the one
component regression is inferior to a specication with multiple components.
This is consistent with our nding that there are two groups with importantly
di¤erent e¤ects with regard to being hyperbolic. As a comparison, we allow
three groups in the FMM specication. The three component model, however,
does not converge.
AIC BIC
One Component Model 375.7218 397.5478
2 Component Model 375.35 382.630
3 Component Model not converging
Table 13: Selection Criteria for various models.
The coe¢ cients of our measure of hyperbolic preference reversals (for the
di¤erent models) is shown in Table 14 below:
59As with most optimisation methods for non-concave functions, the expectation maximisa-
tion algorithm comes with guarantees only of convergence to a local maximum of the objective
function (except in degenerate cases). We deal with this problem by running the procedure
using multiple initial starting parameters and by initialising parameters in a way that breaks
symmetry.
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Overall Component 1 Component 2 Component 3
One Component Model 0.39** X.XX X.XX X.XX
2 Component Model X.XX 0.25 0.89*** X.XX
3 Component Mode not converging
Table 14: Comparison of the e¤ect of hyperbolic preference reversals across
models - Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *
What we nd is that in line with our hypothesis the rst group is signif-
icantly more likely to ...
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14 Appendix E
One possible problem with our analyses in section 6.4 and 7.3. is that (hy-
perbolic) preference reversals may reect something else than temporary short-
sightedness. Four alternative explanations include: i) noise; ii) inability to
understand the questions; iii) the timing of cash ows; and iv) transaction
costs/lack of trust.
The rst alternative explanation for hyperbolic preference reversals is noise:
if households are not sure about their preferences or report their preferences
with some error, it is possible that the reason why certain households appear
more impatient now than later is chance. There are, however, at least two
reasons why this is unlikely:
First of all, if people are not sure about their preferences, it is not clear
why almost twice as many households should report time-inconsistencies in the
hyperbolic direction than in the other direction. Secondly, if the preference
reversals we nd were due to noise only, then they should not predict real be-
haviour, such as whether households self-disconnect more in the autumn/winter
or not.
A second possible explanation for the (hyperbolic) preference reversals we
nd is the inability to understand our hypothetical questions. If less-educated
individuals are more likely to report preference reversals (in either direction)
and less-educated individuals are more likely to self-disconnect primarily in
the autumn/winter, then we would spuriously conclude that the seasonality
in self-disconnections is due to hyperbolic preferences, rather than just a lack
of education.
The problem with this argument is  again  that it is not clear why an
inability to understand our hypothetical question should lead almost twice as
many households to report preference reversals in hyperbolic direction than in
the other direction. In addition, if an inability to understand the hypothetical
questions were at the core of our nding, we would expect a positive correlation
between whether someone is time-inconsistent and their level of education.
This is not the case: Table 15 Columns (1) and (2) below shows the results
from a simple logit model linking whether or not a household is time-inconsistent
with their level of education.
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Coe¢ cient Sim. Prob. Coe¢ cient Sim. Prob
College or more -0.57 -0.11 -0.56 -0.11
(0.36) (0.07) (0.36) (0.07)
Number of hh members -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
HH income 0.01 0.007 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Age 0.002 0.01 0.002 0.008
(0.009) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Low income now, high XX XX -0.06 -0.01
income in 6 m (0.23) (0.05)
High income now, low XX XX 0.12 0.03
income in 6 m (0.38) (0.09)
Female -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02
(0.21) (0.04) (0.21) (0.05)
Marital Status -0.21 -0.04 -0.20 -0.04
(Single=1) (0.24) (0.05) (0.24) (0.05)
Table 15: Robustness Check of our Measure of
Preference Reversals
The table shows that have a college degree or higher does not a¤ect (pos-
itively or negatively) whether respondents display preference reversals. (The
corresponding regression coe¢ cient is statistically insigncant).
A third possible explanation for the (hyperbolic) preference reversals is the
timing of cash ows: households which report patience (impatience) now and
impatience (patience) later may be ushed with cash now (later) but expect to
be short of cash later (now). In order to make sense, such a story also requires
some element of savings (borrowing) constraint.
To test this possibility, we asked households what months are their high-
income and low-income months. We then linked whether they reported time-
inconsistencies (in either direction) to this response to this question. Our nd-
ings are summarised in Table 15 Columns (3) and (4). What we nd is that ex-
pecting a higher (lower) income in 6 months has no signicant e¤ect on whether
respondents display preference reversals.
Finally, it is possible that the (hyperbolic) preference reversals in our data is
lack of trust/transaction costs. For instance, Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukherji
(2002) argue that uncertainty in future rewards will lead individuals to choose
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immediate rewards. This seems unlikely, however, since such an explanation 
again cannot explain why (hyperbolic) preference reversals are correlated with
the seasonal pattern in self-disconnections.
To summarise, although it is possible that our measure of (hyperbolic) pref-
erence reversals reects something else but temporary shortsightedness, we nd
very little evidence to be suspicious that it does.
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